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W HAT fidelity to the Constitution does to us depends on our ex-
perience of constitutional evil. In Agreements with Hell and
Other Objects of Our Faith,1 Professor Balkin observes that "[w]ithin
our legal culture the idea of fidelity to the Constitution is seen as
pretty much an unquestioned good." For many Americans, however,
constitutional fidelity is not at all an indisputable precondition. In the
case of black Americans, it is much more appropriate to begin with
the question, why should they be faithful to the Constitution? How
could black people possibly pledge allegiance to a Constitution that
defined them as less than human, was structured to enslave them, and
has been interpreted time and time again to keep them subjugated to
whites? In light of all the indignities showered upon blacks under
color of the Constitution, I would think the presumption would be
that blacks should repudiate the document and all the injustice for
which it has stood.
Where Balkin ends up-unsettling the notion of constitutional faith
as an unquestioned virtue-is precisely where black Americans begin.
Having been treated as outsiders all along, blacks confront the Consti-
tution with an unavoidable option of accepting or rejecting it. Surpris-
ingly, many prominent black thinkers-even the most radical ones-
not only have failed to reject the Constitution but have made it a high-
light of their advocacy. Black activists from Martin Luther King, Jr. to
the Black Panthers have framed their demands in terms of constitu-
tional rights. While King peacefully insisted that segregation violated
the Constitution, Huey Newton claimed his constitutional right to
bear arms. This Response explores the meaning of blacks' astonishing
fidelity to the Constitution.
I. THE PuRPOsE OF CONSTITUTIONAL FIDELrrY
In each historical period, black Americans have been faithful to a
Constitution that looked very different from the version espoused by
contemporary courts. It is a Constitution that abolished slavery prior
to the Civil War, that provided freed slaves with forty acres and a
mule during Reconstruction, that invalidated separate-but-equal facil-
* Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark.
1. J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 Fordham
L. Rev. 1703 (1997).
2. Id at 1704.
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ities prior to Brown v. Board of Education,3 and that continues to
mandate a radical dismantling of discriminatory structures despite the
Supreme Court's adherence to the doctrine of color blindness. Surely
black people are the main practitioners of what Balkin calls "Ideal
constitutionalism," which "solves the problem of fidelity to an unjust
Constitution by conforming the object of interpretation to our sense
of what is just."4 No self-respecting person could commit to a cove-
nant that denies her humanity. But why have most blacks not rejected
the Constitution altogether? I think the answer is that fidelity to the
Constitution offers practical advantages to black people's struggle for
full citizenship.
The goal of equal citizenship is the heart of black Americans' fidel-
ity to the Constitution. Black people's first commitment is to estab-
lishing their inclusion in the American polity, and fidelity to the
Constitution is a way of achieving that objective. Under this instru-
mental approach, equal citizenship does not arise from the Constitu-
tion; it precedes it. The Constitution is not the standard of justice we
should faithfully uphold; equal citizenship is. We know how to be just
not by immersing ourselves in the Constitution's language but by im-
agining what it would mean for black people to be treated like human
beings. The purpose of constitutional fidelity is to insist that constitu-
tional interpretations abide by this higher standard of justice. In
short, fidelity is a means, not an end, and it is a means to an end that is
more fundamental than the Constitution.
5
Blacks, then, are not faithful to the Constitution because the Con-
stitution deserves their allegiance, for it deserves their cynicism, if not
their contempt. They are faithful to the Constitution because black
people deserve to be included in the Constitution's protections and
promises. Blacks' fidelity to the Constitution is not a duty, it is a de-
mand-a demand to be counted as full members of the political com-
munity. The black nationalist Malcolm X refused to petition whites
for the recognition of blacks' civil rights, relying instead on the more
fundamental notion of human rights. As Malcolm X explained it:
"Human rights are something you were born with. Human rights are
your God-given rights. Human rights are the rights that are recog-
nized by all nations of this earth."6 At the same time, Malcolm X was
the consummate pragmatist, advocating that blacks attempt to win
their freedom by any means necessary. When asked about his attitude
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1709.
5. Cf. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Ninth Chronicle: Race, Legal Instrumental-
ism, and the Rule of Law, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 388 (1994) (advocating "legal instru-
mentalism" that treats law as "a tool that is useful for certain purposes and at certain
times").
6. Malcolm X, The Ballot or the Bullet, Speech at Cory Methodist Church (Apr.
3, 1964), in Malcolm X Speaks 23, 35 (George Breitman ed., 1965).
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toward civil rights organizations, he responded: "I'm for whatever
gets results."7
The source of blacks' fidelity to the Constitution is not to be found
in the Constitution itself. It comes from the faith that the Constitution
will one day be interpreted to include blacks as full citizens. This faith
derives from the belief in oppressed people's determination to be free.
It is the faith embodied in the civil rights movement's conviction that
"we shall overcome." Slave songs vowed that victory unrealized on
earth would surely be achieved in heaven.
This instrumental fidelity to the Constitution is the reason for black
critical race scholars' disagreement with white critical legal studies
scholars over the significance of rights. Scholars such as Kimberl6
Crenshaw, Anthony Cook, and Patricia Williams have argued that the
critics' rejection of rights discounts the importance of rights to blacks'
struggle for equal citizenship.8 Critical legal studies theorists rejected
rights discourse in part because of its stereotyping of human experi-
ence. But Patricia Williams argued that this is a lesser historical evil
than having been ignored altogether: "The black experience of ano-
nymity, the estrangement of being without a name, has been one of
living in the oblivion of society's inverse, beyond the dimension of any
consideration at all."9 By asserting rights, dispossessed people rebel
against this social degradation and demand recognition as full mem-
bers of society. Williams explains: "For the historically dis-
empowered, the conferring of rights is symbolic of all the denied
aspects of their humanity: rights imply a respect that places one in the
referential range of self and others, that elevates one's status from
human body to social being." 10 It is not blacks' assertion of their con-
stitutional rights but America's lack of commitment to these rights
that has preserved the oppressive social order.
This instrumental fidelity to the Constitution is also subject to criti-
cism from the opposite direction. Scholars dedicated to constitutional
interpretation might contend that an instrumental fidelity is not really
fidelity at all; it merely exploits constitutional rhetoric for an ulterior
7. Interview with Malcolm X (Jan. 28, 1965), in Malcolm X Speaks, supra note 6,
at 222, 222.
8. See Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 148-61 (1991);
Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 Harv. L. Rev. 985, 992 (1990); Kimberld W. Crenshaw,
Race Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1356-66 (1988).
9. Patricia J. W'illiams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Decon-
structed Rights, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401, 414 (1987).
10. Wflliams, supra note 8, at 153. Kimberld Crenshaw similarly contends that
rights critics "disregard the transformative potential that liberalism offers. Although
liberal legal ideology may indeed function to mystify, it remains receptive to some
aspirations that are central to Black demands, and may also perform an important
function in combating the experience of being excluded and oppressed." Crenshaw,.
supra note 8, at 1357.
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purpose like a suitor's false profession of love. A second criticism is
that equal citizenship is too limited a focus for an approach to the
entire Constitution. Although it may help us interpret the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, for example, it is useless in figuring the meaning of,
say, the Second Amendment. Finally, blacks taking an instrumental
approach might be accused of an irrational obsession with race. Race
is important, but American politics turns on other important issues as
well. All of these objections crumble in light of the centrality of black
citizenship to the Constitution's meaning.
Whites' persistent mission of denying blacks the rights of citizenship
has stunted official interpretations of the Constitution's provisions,
even those not directly related to racial equality. Numerous constitu-
tional provisions have been interpreted or deployed to deny black citi-
zenship. Of course, the Constitution's original accommodation of
slavery most blatantly accomplished this end. The Constitution's
guarantees of liberty existed alongside its protection of slavery for
nearly a century. But the addition of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments that formally acknowledged black citizenship did not stop an
official regime of segregation, disenfranchisement, and terror that
practically reduced blacks to their former status as slaves." The
Supreme Court interpreted the Commerce Clause, as well as the
Equal Protection Clause, to allow states to segregate public accommo-
dations. More recently, the Court adopted a discriminatory intent
rule because of its fear of the remedies a discriminatory impact rule
would entail, or, as Justice Brennan put it, the Court's "fear of too
much justice."' 2 Justice Harlan had such confidence in the Constitu-
tion's power to preserve white supremacy that he predicted in his dis-
sent in Plessy v. Ferguson'3 that the white race would remain
dominant for all time if it "holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty."' 4
Privileged racial status gives whites a powerful incentive to construe
other constitutional provisions in a way that leaves the existing social
order intact. Many white Americans view a broad range of reforms as
contrary to their self-interest because they perceive black people's so-
cial position to be in opposition to their own. Under American racist
ideology, constitutional interpretations that would benefit blacks are
antithetical to whites' interests because blacks' social advancement di-
minishes white superiority. Derrick Bell has argued that whites in
America-even those who lack wealth and power-believe that they
11. Eric Foner, Nothing but Freedom: Emancipation and Its Legacy 48-59 (1983);
C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 23-25 (3d ed. 1974).
12. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1413-14 (1988).
13. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
14. Id at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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gain from continued economic disparities that leave blacks at the bot-
tom. 5 Thus, racism helps to explain the prevailing understanding of
the Constitution that disregards poverty.
Black activists have claimed that their instrumental approach is
more, not less, faithful to the Constitution. As he sat in a Birmingham
jail, Martin Luther King, Jr. predicted:
One day the South will know that when these disinherited children
of God sat down at lunch counters, they were in reality standing up
for what is best in the American dream and for the most sacred
values in our Judaeo-Christian heritage, thereby bringing our nation
back to those great wells of democracy which were dug deep by the
founding fathers in their formulation of the Constitution and the
Declaration of Independence.
16
We cannot know what the Constitution means until the precondition
of black citizenship is attained. Without this reason for constitutional
fidelity, every attempt at constitutional interpretation makes a mock-
ery of the ideals of equality, liberty, and democracy.
I. RAcIAL DIsPARITIES IN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
This instrumental approach does not shelter blacks from all ill ef-
fects of fidelity to an evil Constitution. Balkin is right that "[t]o
pledge fidelity to something and simultaneously believe it to be rid-
died with evil produces serious cognitive dissonance. '"" As in so
many aspects of American life, however, there are racial differences in
our psychoses. For whites, cognitive dissonance may be a fancy term
for guilt. For blacks, it may be a fancy term for despair.
A. Marginalizing Injustice
The chief psychosis that Balkin attributes to constitutional fidelity
afflicts white people far more than blacks. Balkin worries that "[o]ur
fidelity to the Constitution requires us to believe that it is a basically
good and just document, and that it frames the legal system of a basi-
cally good and just polity."'" The worst symptom of this constitutional
"idolatry" is the tendency "to see injustices as marginal or exceptional
to the political scheme."'19 I think that black folks' experience of op-
pression makes them pretty much immune to this particular ailment.
Being the brunt of the bulk of constitutional evil at least affords what
15. Derrick Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Vell The Permanence of Racism 7-9
(1992) [hereinafter Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the WeU]; Derrick Bell, After We're
Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-Racial Epoch, 34 St. Louis U. L.
393, 402 (1990).
16. Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to several clergymen (Apr. 16, 1963), in
Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can't Wait 77, 99 (1964).
17. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1731.
18. Id at 1729.
19. Id at 1730.
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James Baldwin called the American Negro's "great advantage of hav-
ing never believed in that collection of myths to which white Ameri-
cans cling."2 Blacks do not write off injustices as less monumental
than slavery; rather they tend to view contemporary racist practices as
a perpetuation of slavery's evils-a practice many white people find as
annoying as blacks find whites' belief in American virtue.
The psychosis Balkin describes rests in the mind of someone who
feels bad about injustice but has no real stake in eradicating it. Her
primary interest is in whitewashing the political scheme, perhaps be-
cause she has an unconscious wish that some things would remain the
way they are. Pretending that injustices are aberrational is one of the
techniques white people use to distance themselves from their own
involvement, either direct or indirect, in oppression so they can sleep
well at night.
The peculiar way of thinking that says "injustices that the ideal
Constitution does not and cannot reach cannot be deep and profound
ones" also stems from too much devotion to the Constitution itself.
2'
Black people cannot afford to think that way. Relinquishing the belief
that the ideal Constitution requires equal citizenship is inconceivable.
The ideal Constitution must reach the deep and profound injustice of
denying blacks' equality or it is useless. There would be no point in
even embarking on the enterprise of constitutional interpretation. If
the Constitution cannot incorporate blacks as full citizens then the
game is over. We might as well collect our chips and go home.
B. Frederick Douglass's Idealism
One malady Balkin diagnoses in a black man is delusion-the mis-
guided faith in an ideal Constitution that does not really exist. Balkin
criticizes Frederick Douglass for being "off the wall" because
Douglass claimed that the Constitution prohibited slavery at a time
when no judge even questioned slavery's constitutional status.2
Douglass is the type of idealist who "offer[s] theories of interpretation
that produce a 'Shadow Constitution' that remedies the positive law
of the Constitution of its existing defects."3 Certainly Douglass was
well aware of the effects of the positive law of slavery-he himself
grew up in chains. He was no starry-eyed romantic. He came to his
position on the Constitution after years of careful consideration and
political advocacy. Douglass initially adhered to the Garrisonian re-
jection of the Constitution as a slaveholding document. In 1849, he
wrote:
20. James Baldwin, The Fire Next Tune 115 (1963).
21. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1732.
22. Id. at 1709-10.
23. Id. at 1710.
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[T]he original intent and meaning of the Constitution (the one given
to it by the men who framed it, those who adopted it, and the one
given to it by the Supreme Court of the United States) makes it a
pro-slavery instrument [which] I cannot bring myself to vote under,
or swear to support.24
Douglass argued the Garrisonian position in a debate in Syracuse,
New York, in 1850, proclaiming that the Framers "attempted to unite
Liberty in holy wedlock with the dead body of Slavery, and the whole
was tainted. Let this unholy, unrighteous union be dissolved."'
What led Douglass to reverse his stance on the Constitution? In his
autobiography, Douglass describes the change in his views after he left
New England for Rochester, New York, to publish his paper, The
North Star; lecture against slavery; and conceal fugitive slaves in the
underground railroad:
By such a course of thought and reading I was conducted to the
conclusion that the Constitution of the United States-inaugurated
to "form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty"--could not well have
been designed at the same time to maintain and perpetuate a system
of rapine and murder like slavery, especially as not one word can be
found in the Constitution to authorize such a belief.
26
Douglass stuck to his position that America had only two options:
either it could abide by a Constitution that recognized blacks' equal
citizenship, and therefore prohibited slavery, or the Union would have
to be dissolved. It seems Douglass decided it made far more sense to
interpret the Constitution to incorporate blacks than to tear the coun-
try asunder. His conversion was not a conservative concession to
slaveholders but a radical reinterpretation of the text that recognized
black humanity. He did not select out the portions of the Constitution
he admired and ignore its less palatable parts. Rather, he applied the
well-accepted method of interpreting a document's parts in light of
the whole: "[I]f the declared purposes of an instrument are to govern
the meaning of all of its parts and details, as they clearly should," he
argued, "the Constitution of our country is our warrant for the aboli-
tion of slavery in every State of the Union." 27
Compare Douglass's constitutional faith to Justice Story's. Accord-
ing to Balkin, Story followed a strategy of preserving the Union by
24. Letter from Frederick Douglass to C.H. Chase, in The North Star, Feb. 9, 1849,
reprinted in 1 The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass: Early Years, 1817-1849,
at 352, 353 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950).
25. 2 The Frederick Douglass Papers, 1847-54, at 223 (John W. Blassingame ed.,
1982).
26. Frederick Douglass, The Life and Tunes of Frederick Douglass 261-62 (Mac-
Milan Co. 1962) (1892).
27. Id at 262.
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upholding the right of slave owners to regain their slaves. 8 Because
of his faith in the Constitution itself, Story believed that the conflict
between the Constitution and social justice would be resolved eventu-
ally. Douglass, on the other hand, had faith in blacks' ultimate libera-
tion and followed a strategy of fidelity to constitutional ideals to
achieve this end. Douglass's fidelity required denying whites the right
to hold slaves altogether under the Constitution.
I do not see Douglass's constitutional idealism as skirting the prob-
lem of constitutional evil or "assuaging the cognitive dissonance pro-
duced by fidelity to the Constitution in a world of injustice. '2 9 It was
a way of exposing the nation's sins and demanding the nation's repen-
tance. Black activists simultaneously have denounced constitutional
evil while relying on constitutional ideals. Indeed, the very point of
insisting on the Constitution's ideals is to shine light on the evil prac-
tices inflicted in the name of the Constitution. Blacks have criticized
racial injustice not by hiding their eyes to constitutional evil, but by
showing how that evil diverges from the just results of a properly in-
terpreted Constitution. Douglass taunted the Framers when he said
"they wrote of Liberty in the Declaration of Independence with one
hand, and with the other clutched their brother by the throat! '30
W.E.B. Du Bois mocked Americans' false patriotism when he de-
scribed white spectators' delight over the burning body of a black pris-
oner lynched in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, in 1911: "'Oh, say, can you
see by the dawn's early light' that soap box of blackened bones and
dust."
'3 1
The height of blacks' cynical legalism was the Black Panthers' prac-
tice of surrounding police while they arrested a black man, demand-
ing, law books in hand, that the "pigs" abide by the letter of the law.31
The Black Panthers, as well as Malcolm X, relied on the Second
Amendment to support black people's right to arm themselves against
racist violence.33 This is the paradox of blacks' fidelity to the Consti-
tution: Blacks have no reason to have faith in the Constitution that
was designed to exclude them; yet they have remained faithful to the
Constitution in the struggle for citizenship by relentlessly demanding
that its interpretation live up to its highest principles and follow its
strictest requirements.
It is not black people's faith in the ideal of equality that causes cog-
nitive dissonance. Indeed, black people's pathologies have been
caused by the lack of idealism, by trying to be an American within the
28. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1708.
29. Id at 1731.
30. 2 The Frederick Douglass Papers, supra note 25, at 223.
31. W.E.B. Du Bois, Triumph, in The Oxford W.E.B. Du Bois Reader 376, 377
(1996).
32. David R. Papke, The Black Panther Party's Narratives of Resistance, 18 Vt. L.
Rev. 645, 675 (1994).
33. Id; Malcolm X Speaks, supra note 6, at 43.
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current order. Many blacks suffered the humiliation of passing as
white in order to receive the benefits of citizenship. Cheryl Harris
explains that her Negro grandmother presented herself as a white wo-
man when she sought employment at a major retail store in Chicago
in the 1930s because "[b]ecoming white increased the possibility of
controlling critical aspects of one's life rather than being the object of
others' domination."' 4 It is hard to imagine the psychological trauma
of not only taking on the identity of someone else, but of someone
who holds you in contempt.
Of course, black people must conceal their true selves daily in less
conspicuous ways to be eligible for even second-rate citizenship. Du
Bois described the schizophrenia that results when a black person
tries to fit into the current racist culture: "One ever feels his two-
ness,-an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unrecon-
ciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. ' 35 Du Bois con-
cluded that blacks' wholeness depended on striving to "make it possi-
ble for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being
cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Op-
portunity closed roughly in his face."'36 It is only faith in the eventual
victory of their constitutional vision of equal citizenship that allows
blacks to maintain any semblance of sanity.
C. Derrick Bell's Antidote for Despair
The fact that blacks typically are not plagued by the type of cogni-
tive dissonance Balkin describes does not mean their fidelity is with-
out psychological cost. A contemporary example of a black person
grappling with the trauma of constitutional fidelity is Professor Der-
rick Bell. Professor Bell's writings, some of the most piercing criti-
ques of constitutional evil of our time, have become increasingly
pessimistic about the chances for racial justice in America 7.3  Bell
points to whites' persistent refusal to abdicate their racial domination
while repeatedly sacrificing black people's rights. Despite decades de-
voted to civil rights protest and litigation based on constitutional fidel-
ity, the economic and political condition of the majority of blacks has
worsened. Bell's observations echo Malcolm X's warning thirty years
ago that blacks were "wasting [their] time appealing to the moral con-
science of a bankrupt man like Uncle Sam."'' Like Bell, Malcolm X
34. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L Rev. 1707, 1713 (1993).
35. W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk 3 (Kraus-Thomson Org. Ltd. 1973).
36. Id. at 4.
37. For an example of this development, see Derrick Bell, And We Are Not
Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice (1987); Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the
Well, supra note 15; and Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 Conn. L Rev. 363 (1992)
[hereinafter Bell, Racial Realism].
38. Malcolm X Speaks, supra note 6. at 40.
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noted that white Americans would not eliminate the evil of racism
because it is evil; rather, "they eliminate it only when it threatens their
existence.1
39
Bell draws the conclusion that our commitment to racial equality
can only lead to despair. Bell therefore urges the following bleak
manifesto:
Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even
those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more
than temporary "peaks of progress," short-lived victories that slide
into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white
dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact that all history verifies.
We must acknowledge it and move on to adopt policies based on
what I call: "Racial Realism." This mind-set or philosophy requires
us to acknowledge the permanence of our subordinate status.
40
Bell argues that this realistic stance is the antidote to the psychological
weight of despair, freeing blacks to try new racial strategies that are
more feasible than fidelity to the Constitution.4'
How does black people's despair differ from the cognitive disso-
nance that afflicts white people? As Balkin recognizes, fidelity is a
mutual experience; "[t]here is an important connection between fidel-
ity and the existential commitment of trust."'42 Bell's message is that,
despite black people's patient faithfulness, America has not recipro-
cated and never will. Racism makes America fundamentally untrust-
worthy. There are particularly good reasons for blacks not to have
faith in the victory of their ideal Constitution.
If blacks despair, it is not because they were deluded into thinking
that white people meant for the Constitution to include them, or that
the injustices they experienced were aberrational, or that interpreta-
tions of the Constitution alone could overcome racism. Rather, it
stems from the realization that the strategy of constitutional fidelity
will fail to make blacks full citizens because white supremacy is too
powerful a force to vanquish. This despair is not the same thing as
finding out that the God we worshipped is actually a demon,43 for
blacks are well aware that American justice has been more wicked
than divine. It is more like a prisoner discovering that the route he
had painstakingly shoveled out to escape his unjust confinement leads
back to the wretched cell he fled. The strategy he had pinned his
hopes on is hopelessly futile. It is the tension between blacks' right-
eous desire to be citizens and the recognition that this may be unat-
tainable in white America.
39. Id.
40. Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 37, at 373-74 (emphasis omitted).
41. Id. at 374.
42. Balkin, supra note 1, at 1721.
43. See id. at 1725.
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Other black scholars have rejected Bell's prescription of racial real-
ism on the ground that it misdiagnosed black people's problem."
john powell, for example, argues that Bell erroneously attributes the
injury suffered by the black community to its false consciousness
about rights rather than the Supreme Court's perpetuation of racial
dominance.45 In powell's view, Bell therefore incorrectly concludes
that "it is the false hope for equality, and not racism, that must be
vanquished."'' Black people may suffer from despair, says powell,
but it is "a material problem rooted in the structure of racism," rather
than "a psychological problem in the minds of black people."47
Professor Bell's sober assessment of racism's intransigence counsels
against a naive faith in the moral power of the Constitution alone to
bring about racial equality. Yet it need not defeat blacks' instrumen-
tal fidelity to the Constitution as part of a social movement for equal
citizenship. Blacks' constitutional fidelity is not the faith that the
Constitution will end racism. The constitutional allegiance of black
leaders such as Douglass, Du Bois, and King was grounded in their
participation in social struggle for citizenship rights. They could hold
fast to a vision of an ideal Constitution despite their awareness of con-
stitutional evil because of their commitment to a liberation move-
ment. As I stated elsewhere, "Blacks must continue to struggle for
citizenship-not in America as we know it, but in a nation radically
transformed by Blacks' very efforts to achieve social justice."48 It is
that struggle that deserves our utmost fidelity.
44. See generally Commentary on Racial Realism, 24 Conn. L Rev. 497, 497-565
(1992) (compiling the works of various commentators who advocate approaches other
than Bell's).
45. john a. powell, Racial Realism or Racial Despair?, 24 Conn. L Rev. 533, 540
(1992).
46. Id at 534.
47. Id at 543.
48. Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 Yale
L". 1563, 1602 (1996) (book review).
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